Since the end of the Cold War there has been growing attention paid to relation ships between environment and security.
Introduction
Over the past ten to fifteen years, academics and policymakers around the world have paid growing attention to relationships between en vironmental factors and security. As Japan struggles to define a regional political and secu rity role commensurate with its economic stat ure, many have suggested that Japan could make a significant contribution to regional se curity through environmental leadership (mainly through diplomacy and provision of environmental ODA). Indeed, some commenta tors (e.g. Maddock 1995) see Japan as the only nation in the East Asian region capable of fil ling the role of an environmental security leader. For instance, Japan is a recognized inno vator in antipollution and low emission tech nology.
Japan has also played an important international role in reducing stratospheric ozone (Schreurs 1994) .
The government of Japan, itself, has proposed that environmental degradation is a security concern and that through overseas environ mental protection initiatives it can promote hu man security, international stability, and the well-being of Japan's citizens.
For example, Japan's Initiative for Sustainable Development (ISD) stresses a need to "address the environ mental degradation that threatens human exis tence and that constitutes a security issue in a broad sense (MOFA 1999) ." Meanwhile Japan's 1996 ODA Summary states: "In the mutually interdependent world, the various problems emerging [including environmental ones] in de veloping countries constitute a threat to the people living in the developed countries, includ ing Japan. Japan's contributions to overcoming these threats results in securing the Japanese people's living in the end (MOFA 1996a) ."
Such assertions are conceptually consistent with Japan's doctrine of 'Comprehensive Secu rity' of which emphasizes, among other things, the importance of food and energy security and promoting stability abroad. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, 'security' will be regarded holistically and comprehensively to include both military and non-military threats to the well being of states as well as human beings in general ('human security'). Thus it will address both interstate and domestic political and eco nomic security issues as well as resource and transnational issues (e.g. drugs, piracy, migra tion, disease).
The previously discussed claims of Japan's environmental leadership have also generated criticism.
Some analysts contend that Japan should be viewed as a threat to the global envi ronment rather than a protector of it. Taylor (1999) , for instance, contends that Japan has not met its stated international environmental ob jectives but instead suffers serious domestic environmental problems while adversely im pacting the environment abroad. Others sug gest that Japan's environmental international initiatives are not designed to promote security and stability but are merely part of a strategy for continuing economic expansion overseas (e.g. Bello 1995) . Despite the aforementioned government statements and scholarly debates, there has been little research into whether or not Japan actually faces a credible and specific security threat from environmental problems overseas. If Japan is to effectively justify, craft, and sus tain environmental security polices and inte grate them with wider strategic initiatives then more research is needed on whether or not, how, and to what extent environmental prob lems abroad pose a threat.
Even though the environment is now one of the most popular topics for scholarly study in Japan, environ mental problems are generally viewed as scien tific or technical in nature rather than as na tional security issues (Akaneya 1998) . Further more, security research has been a taboo sub ject among Japanese academics so there have been few multi-or interdisciplinary efforts to synthesize research on environmental issues within a security context (Akaneya 1998) . One notable exception is Kato and Nishi's 1993 book entitled Kokusai funso to Nihon (International Conflicts and Japan) that addresses a wide range of non-traditional security threats such as population growth, environmental degrada tion, disease, drugs, terrorism, and piracy (Akaneya 1998 This is typified by the "Toronto School" which contends that resource scarcities can play a causal role in the outbreak of violent conflict (particularly at the sub national level) and/or the undermining of state capacity and hence political stability (e.g. Homer-Dixon, Bouthwell, and Rathjens 1993; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998). Environmental security re search, on the other haul, has been criticized for its narrow focus that has not provided the "big picture" context sought by the policy com munity (Ronnfeldt 1997) and it has generally not dealt with transnational security issues aside from migration.
In order to help address some of the afore mentioned research gaps, this paper presents an overview of environmental threats to Japan's security emanating from Southeast Asia. After a brief introduction to environment-security analysis, the strategic importance of Southeast Asia to Japan will be described along with the principal threats to Japan's national interests in the region. Next, an overview of the region's major environmental problems is provided. Fi nally, the way in which environmental prob lems contribute to the previously identified threats to Japan (such as political and economic instability, piracy, and disease) will be evalu ated. Where appropriate, research by geogra phers will be singled out in order to highlight the potential for geographic analysis to be in corporated in environmental security studies.
Strategic
and Economic Relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia
As a resource poor nation surrounded by de veloping countries Japan is dependent upon their economic growth and political security for its own well being (Kusano 2000) . Not surpris ingly, Southeast Asia has been identified by Japanese policymakers as one of the four strate gically most important regions to Japan (Shibu sawa 1984; Olsen 1989; Maddock 1995) . There Due to its geographical proximity, Southeast Asia is naturally an area of concern to Japanese policymakers ( Figure 1 ). Southeast Asia is es pecially significant because it is located astride some of the world's most important sea lanes. Five of the world's 20 most important maritime straits are located in the region.
The main shipping routes connecting Japan with Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, Australia, Africa, and Southeast Asia cross the region's seas. Sev enty percent of Japan's oil imports pass through Southeast Asian waters (Bradshaw 1997) . In 1993, 42% of Japan's total exports valued at $153 billion went to or passed through Southeast Asia while 52% of Japan's imports worth $102 billion are shipped from or through Southeast Asia (Noer and Gregory 1996) . Three of Japan's top ten trading partners (based upon International Trade Commission figures) Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore, are in Southeast Asia (Chinworth 1996) . Nearly 38% (of total value) of Japan's 1995 imports were shipped from ASEAN, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East (Chinworth 1996) . Southeast Asia is well endowed with natural resources important to Japan's economic, en ergy, and food security.
Indonesia is Japan's third largest crude oil supplier, providing Japan with 11°c of its oil supply (over 254,400,000 kiloliters) between 1985 (MITI 1995 . In donesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are Japan's top suppliers of natural gas accounting for 7100 of natural gas imports between 1985 (MITI 1995 and 65% in 1999 (ASEAN-Japan Center 2000) . Malaysia, alone, supplies 85 to 90% of Japan's tropical wood supply. In 1999 Indonesia and the Philippines provided 88% of Japan's unrefined copper, 23% copper ore, and 46% nickel ore requirements (ASEAN-Japan Centre 2000) . Over 97% of natural rubber ex ports to Japan in 1999 came from Southeast Asia (ASEAN-Japan Center 2000) . Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia supply Japan with 76% of its tin needs (ASEAN-Japan Center 2000) . Much of Japan's antimony, cadmium, titanium, bauxite, beryllium, tantalum, rare earths, and precious metals come from sources in the Pacific Basin and are transported through Southeast Asian waters. Japan's abil ity to supply for its "food energy needs" has dropped by 6% since 1985 and imports now provide 65% of its "food energy" (MAFF 1995) . Since 1995 Thailand has been one of Japan's top 5 food suppliers (MITI 1996) .
Southeast Asia accounts for 11% of world aquaculture production and 1100 of total ma rine fisheries catches (World Resources Insti tute 1997). In the meantime Japan's imports of fish and shellfish have risen steadily over the past 5 years (15,930 to 16,313 hundred million yen) while its ability to supply its seafood needs has declined from 97% in 1985 to 73% in 1994 (MoF 1996; MAFF 1995) . In 1999 over 46% of Japan's yellow fin tuna exports came from Southeast Asia while Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam satisfied 54% of Japan's demand for frozen shrimp (ASEAN-Japan Center 2000) .
Southeast Asia is also an important destina tion for Japanese investment. Japanese foreign direct investment (FDI) in the region grew from $7,027 million to $40,295 million between 1980 and 1994 (Karan and Jasparro 2000) . ASEAN was receiving 14% of all Japanese FDI in 1995 (MOFA 1996b . The Region is an im portant and growing (not counting the effects of the 1997 crisis) market for Japanese prod ucts. Japan's seventh (Singapore), eighth (Thai land), and tenth (Malaysia) largest export mar kets are in Southeast Asia (Chinworth 1996) . In 1993,13.6% of Japan's exports went to ASEAN members (MOFA 1996b Southeast Asia currently has the highest de forestation rates in the world losing 1.3 to 1.9 million hectares (ha) per year (UNEP 1997). With deforestation comes loss of biodiversity, soil erosion and degradation, and disruption of hydrologic cycles. For example, in the Philip pines soil erosion may be occurring at ten to twenty times beyond sustainable levels (Mad dock 1995) .
Problems regarding freshwater quality and quantity are growing in the region. According to the UNEP (1997) 54% of Southeast Asian lakes suffer from eutrophication problems while many rivers are contaminated with pathogens from sewage, industry and agricul ture. Per capita water availability has fallen by up to 65% in Asia since 1950 (Dupont 1998) and by 2025 many of the countries in the region will be facing water shortages. Land subsi dence due to ground-water depletion is becom ing a serious problem in Bangkok and Jakarta.
Pollution, over fishing, sedimentation, and mangrove deforestation are taking a heavy toll on the region's coastal and marine ecosystems and resources. For example, since 1960 Thai land has lost 50% (800 square miles) of its mangroves.
Cambodia, Vietnam, and peninsu lar Malaysia have lost most of their mangroves as well (Howard 1993) . The region's fisheries are profoundly stressed and are being pushed to the point of collapse yet Southeast Asian nations continue to expand their fleets. Accord ing to Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) statistics the waters of the Southwest Pacific were being fished at maximum levels in 1991 and by 1994 were being over fished (World Resources Institute 2001 (Brown et al. 1997 ). In the late 1980s airborne emissions exceeded rec ommended levels by over 50% in Kuala Lum pur, 250% in Bangkok, and 300% in Jakarta (Auty 1997) . The World Bank estimates that industrial expansion will increase the levels of suspended particulates by 15 times, biological oxygen loads (BUD) loads by 10 times, and bio accumulates (mercury, lead) by 19 times in parts of Indonesia by 2020 (World Bank 1997a). Vehicles and industry emissions and expansion of cities are creating urban heat islands. Kuala Lumpur's mean annual temperature is 1-2 de grees C higher than the surrounding country side (Sani 1984 (Sani , 1993 . The effect is intensified at night when city temperatures can be up to 6 degrees C hotter. The "scale of increase in toxic solid waste in Thailand [is] projected to be threefold within a decade" (Auty 1997) . Haz ardous waste is disposed of without regard to human or environmental health. Energy consumption is growing rapidly in Southeast Asia. According to the International Energy Agency (TEA) this trend will continue as world energy consumption jumps 50% by the year 2010 (Oil and Gas Journal 1994) placing increasing strain on the availability of energy resources.
Between 1980 and 1998 average commercial energy consumption grew yearly by 2.2°o in Cambodia, 2.6°o Laos, 3°o Vietnam, 3.7% Philippines, 4.6% Indonesia, and 7.9 Thailand and Malaysia (World Bank 2001; McKenzie Consultants 1995) . At these rates even Indonesia, the region's largest oil producer could fall from a net exporter of oil to a net importer by early this century (World Bank 1997a; Howard 1993 ).
Environment-Security
Threat Analysis
Regional political and economic stability are essential for Japan to maintain unfettered ac cess to Southeast Asian resources and sea lanes and to reap the benefits of its investments and markets.
Any conflict or political unrest that hinders Japan's access to resources or sea lines of communications (SLOCs) pose an obvious danger to Japan's vital interests.
In addition, political or economic instability that disrupts or undermines Japanese markets and investments directly threaten Japan's economy. Lastly, Ja pan's geographic proximity to and high level of economic integration with Southeast Asia ex pose it to various transnational problems (i.e. organized crime, drug trafficking, illegal migra tion, disease, piracy) that directly (e.g. pirate attacks against Japanese shipping) and indi rectly (e.g. undermining of regional political/ economic stability) endanger Japan. Environ mental degradation is increasingly contribut ing to political and economic instability, con flict, and transnational problems in Southeast Asia. Consequently, the deterioration of South east Asia's environment and resource base is inimical to Japan's overall security.
There are several ways in which environ ment and security can interact. First, environ mental problems may directly threaten the well being of a state or its people. For example, pollution, crop failure, loss of natural resources (oil, water, etc.) can affect the lives and health of citizens or the viability of a state or its econ omy. Second, renewable resource scarcity (wa ter shortages, deforestation, soil erosion) caused by a combination of population pressure, ineq uitable distribution/access and inefficiency can help precipitate conflict or instability by exac erbating ethnic, social or political tensions, un dermining economic development, and causing population displacement (Homer-Dixon, Bouth well, and Rathjens 1993; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998). These processes generally occur at the subnational scale. Environmental degradation and resource scarcity may also fuel transna tional security threats such as piracy, drug trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking/illegal migration and the spread of infectious disease. Third, resource competition may help spark conflict between states (e.g. over oil or water). However, while conflict and competition over oil and fuel resources is a recognized feature of international geopolitics, there is less agree ment over whether or not renewable resource scarcity warrants such concern. For example, the idea of impending `water wars' has become increasingly popular (e.g. Sherk 1999 Wolf 2000) . For the most part analysts suggest water scarcity should be con sidered as one variable operating among many in what are highly complex, multi-dimensional contexts (Shaheen 2000; Butts 1998 ).
Political instability
Political instability and conflict have the po tential to interrupt resource flows to Japan, threaten freedom of the seas, and undermine Japanese markets and investments in South east Asia.
For example, fighting over the Spratly's could disrupt maritime shipping routes critical to Japan while civil wars and insurgencies can interfere with the extraction of resources and economic activity. Interviews with Japanese representatives of 56 firms with operations in Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore reveal the importance of politi cal stability to Japanese business activities in the region. Of 56 interviewees, 36 considered political stability as an extremely important factor in their locational decision making while another 19 (for a total of 55) believed it to be moderately important (Karan and Jasparro 2000) .
In many parts of Southeast Asia an interre lated cycle of poverty, population pressure, en vironmental degradation and unsustainable re source extraction have created a situation of renewable resource scarcity. This in turn has led to resource competition between groups within states that has become a source of con flict and internal instability.
Particularly hard hit by this cycle are rural, minority, ethnic groups who can no longer subsist by traditional means and who are only marginally integrated into national political and economic systems. Today resource competition and environmental degradation play a role in numerous internal Southeast Asian conflicts ( For example, indigenous resistance to mining operations by P. T. Freeport (a multinational venture operating with support of the Indone sian government) has been particularly bitter. Freeport operates the world's largest gold mine, which is Indonesia's leading generator of tax revenue (Bridland 2001) .
Mining activities have degraded the environment and forced the relocation of indigenous peoples while huge profits been garnered by Jakarta and the mine's multinational backers. Freeport confiscated territory occupied by the Amungme and Kamoro tribes in 1967 without their consent. According agreements with the Indonesia gov ernment the mine was only obligated to com pensate members of tribes for "dwellings and permanent improvements" (Abrash 2001 ). Compensation for the environmental resources upon which their modes of subsistence and cul tural systems were built such as gardens, water, forest products, sacred places, and fishing areas were not included.
The Amungme interpret environmental degradation from strip mining, forest clearance, and water pollution (from dis posal of mine tailings) as "killing their mother and polluting the milk on which they depend foe sustenance" (Abrash 2001) . Meanwhile, the majority of jobs at the mine were given to outsiders.
In Between 50-70% of people in the Philippines depend upon agriculture, fishing, and forestry for their livelihood (Myers 1993; Neher and Marlay 1995; Collingwood 1995) . Over fishing, deforestation, destruction of coastal resources (i.e. coral reefs and mangroves), soil erosion, and deterioration of water resources have severely degraded the country's subsistence base. A combination of population growth and urban/ industrial expansion has created a shortage of farmland. The average amount of farmland per rural inhabitant is now under 1 acre (Myers 1993) . The World Bank (1997b) estimated that 8-10 million Filipinos have moved into upland areas as a result of farmland shortages. Envi ronmental degradation exacerbates rural pov erty by making subsistence increasingly difficult. In the absence of viable alternatives a growing population continues to overexploit the land. Land tenure problems intensify this vicious cycle. Three percent of the population controls over 25% of the land (Myers 1993 (Dupont 1998) . Caused by a combination of logging and burning by plantation companies and drought (related to El Nino), the fires negatively impacted health and economies beyond Indonesia's borders. For ex ample, in the Philippines over 100 children were hospitalized with respiratory problems while at least 16,000 Malaysians fell ill. Accord ing to some estimates the fires cost Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore at least $1.4 billion.
Among the most contentious international security issues in Southeast Asia today are Ex clusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and boundary dis putes. While none of these has yet erupted into full-scale warfare they are a continuing source friction.
Competition for water, fish, and en ergy exacerbates these quarrels. For example, as Asia's energy needs grow, control of the Spratly Islands (and their potential gas, oil, min eral, and fish reserves) may become an increas ingly volatile issue. Fishery disputes are par ticularly divisive in Southeast Asia. In addition to being a food security issue, fishing is also big business.
Thailand While there is little historical precedent for water scarcity to provoke interstate conflict, the potential for water issues to become conten tious among Southeast Asian states cannot be dismissed, as increasing demands are place on the region's water supplies.
While the 1995 Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin was an important step in promoting collaboration among the six Mekong River states, it has not eliminated the potential for water-induced con flict (Dupont 1998) . The agreement allows states to divert the river's water without con sulting each other or conducting environ mental impact statements.
Meanwhile the rights of hill tribe minority groups dependent upon Mekong water and who have traditionally exhibited violent opposition to state govern ments have not been addressed (Dupont 1998) . Water also has the potential to create problems between Singapore and Malaysia. Singapore is almost entirely dependent upon Malaysia for its freshwater supply while Malaysia is expected to face significant water shortages in the not distant future.
Economic instability
Because of the importance of regional mar kets and the high level of Japanese investment, economic instability in Southeast Asia can im pact Japan's own economic security. Like po litical stability, favorable economic conditions are considered vital to the success of Japanese business activities in Southeast Asia. Forty nine of fifty-three officials surveyed from Japa nese firms located in Southeast Asia regard macroeconomic stability as important (Karan and Jasparro 2000) . Environmental degrada tion, however, is undermining economic growth and development throughout Southeast Asia.
The costs of environmental problems in effect enact an implied tax on the countries of the region (United States Pacific Command 2000) . For example, the World Bank estimates environmental degradation costs 5% of Asia's regional GDP (World Bank 1997c). According to some scenarios, responding to global warm ing could cost a 2-9% GDP loss in developing countries (Brown et al. 1997) . In cities such as Bangkok and Jakarta air pollution creates up to $1 billion per year in health costs (World Bank 1997c) . Nationally the costs of air pollution in Indonesia and Thailand equals 2% of their GDPs, a total of 2.2 and 1.6 billion respectively (United States Pacific Command 2000) . Jakarta has an open-ditch sanitation system, serving as a conduit for all industrial and municipal wastewater that was designed when the city had 500,000 residents.
With 11.5 million in habitants, the system cannot cope and contrib utes to contamination of drinking water and health problems (Holcombe 1999) . In order to have clean water Jakarta households spend 50 million per year (1% of the city's GDP) to boil water (Brown et al. 1997) .
The World Bank has recently warned Indone sia that illegal logging is significantly damag ing the country's economy (from lost revenue and environmental damage) and has threatened to restrict lending.
Uncollected revenues on illegally harvested timber are thought by Bank officials to range from $400 to $600 million, about the Bank's current annual lending to the Indonesia (Richardson 2001) . Other problems such as flooding also exact significant economic tolls throughout the region.
For instance, in November 1988, flashfloods devastated south ern Thailand.
Villages were washed away, crops destroyed, and people killed. In Novem ber of 1991 flooding killed over 3,000 people in the Philippines (Howard 1993) and destroyed crops and property worth millions of dollars. Floods in 1995 affected 10% of Thailand's agri cultural land and damaged over 30% of Laos' crops (Vatikiokis 1995 The dramatic rise of piracy in Southeast Asia over the last four years has largely been attrib uted to the 1997 economic crisis and political instability in Indonesia (Lintner 2000) . Since 1995 attacks on Japanese ships in Southeast Asian waters have increased nearly fivefold (Lintner 2000) . In response Japan has proposed to establish and contribute Maritime Safety Agency ships to multinational piracy patrols. This however was greeted with suspicion and reluctance by Southeast Asian governments . Geographers have long claimed that environ ment plays an important role in the occurrence of piracy. Wind patterns and the configuration of coasts and islands act as enablers to piracy while environmental degradation can push peo ple to piracy as other means of livelihood falter (Semple 1916; Whittlesey 1939; Pennell 1994) . For example, Pennell (1994) explains how de forestation and soil erosion related to popula tion pressure combined with economic and po litical instability helped push agriculturalists in the Guelaya region of Morocco into piracy dur ing the mid-nineteenth century. In Southeast Asia, degradation of coastal re sources and declining fish stocks may be sig nificant factors behind the most common type of pirate attacks. Most incidents in the region involve impoverished fishermen boarding ves sels to steal money and other valuables (Lintner 2000) . International
Maritime Bureau (IMB) statistics show an increase in the use of knives in pirate attacks relative to guns over the past four years.
In 1999, fifty-one pirate attacks involved knives while only fourteen involved guns (IMB 1999) . The use of knives indicates that the attackers are poor fishermen as op posed to rogue military units or members of organized criminal organizations.
Piracy also poses a direct threat to the environment itself Drug trafficking is another major transna tional security issue in Southeast Asia. Profits from the trade undermine political stability by facilitating corruption and funding insurgem cies. Growing addiction rates undermine eco nomic development by diverting resources to treating health problems (addiction, HIV/AIDS) and fighting crime. Meanwhile, most of the illegal drugs entering from Japan are produced in Southeast Asia.
Environmental factors play a significant role in the location and occurrence of illegal drug production and trafficking and have attracted the attention of geographers.
For instance, Crooker 1988 examined how human ecology and resource scarcity contributed to opium pro duction in northern Thailand (for a geographi cal analysis of opium production in Egypt see Hobbs 1998) .
During the 1970s and 1980s population pressure and land shortages led to shortening fallow periods in dry-rice swidden agriculture.
This resulted in declining rice yields that in turn prompted hill tribes to in crease opium production. Opium grows well in the area, even on degraded land, and requires few inputs. Likewise, in Burma increasing land pressure, deforestation, soil degradation are fac tors that have helped spur opium production. In remote areas opium is the most profitable agricultural pursuit and profits from the trade have allowed drug barons to become providers of development aid in lieu of aid organizations (Steinberg 2000) . However, environmental deg radation has now reached the point where even a crop as well suited to marginal conditions as opium is becoming increasingly harder to main tain. For instance, drought conditions in 1994 (and again in 1998) decreased opium produc tion by 30% and production levels still have not reached 1993 levels. Partly in response, production of methamphetemines (which is not affected by environmental conditions) skyrock eted between 1993-94 and continues to grow. Officials estimate that 2001 will see between 700-800 million pills enter the Thailand; double that of (Economist 2001 .
Eradication and crops substitution efforts have dramatically cut opium production but have unleashed a host of other environmental problems in Thailand.
Upland villagers have been forced to replace opium with other cash crops. However few crops approach the eco logical suitability of opium. New cash crops (such as cabbage) require much more land to be cleared than opium.
This in turn increases deforestation, soil erosion, and sedimentation of rivers. These crops also need large amounts of chemical inputs. Increased fertilizer and pesti cide use has killed fish, sickened tribesmen, and contaminated lowland farming areas. The cost of inputs has become a financial burden to many peasant farmers. Replacement crops also require large amounts of water, which exacer bates existing water scarcity problems.
Illegal migration and refugee movements are a growing security concern in the Asia-Pacific region. Environmental degradation in conjunc tion with poverty, unemployment, and political unrest have emerged as a key factor behind migration in the Asia-Pacific region (Scholen hardt 2000) .
Large-scale and uncontrolled movements of people can alter ethnic balances, cause political instability or facilitate the spread of crime and disease (Smith 2000) . For example a 1997 drought displaced 200,000 on Mindanao while in November 2000 floods from torrential rains forced tens of thousands to leave their homes in Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Sea level rise associated with global warming could prove extremely disruptive in Southeast Asia. The UNEP regards the deltas of the Mekong, Chao Praya, Salween, and Irra waddy as "severe risk" areas. In the Mekong Delta 10 million people live in areas no more than 3 feet above high tide levels (Myers 1993 ). An Asian Development Bank (ADB) report esti mates that 10% of Vietnam's population could be displaced by sea level rise (Kleiner 1994 (Neher 1996) . Ja pan itself is at risk from diseases and viruses diffusing from the region (e.g. HIV/AIDS). As stated previously, environmental problems are push factors behind rural-urban migration of women into the Thai sex industry that is in turn fueling the explosion and spread of AIDS. Furthermore, many northern Thai communi ties are rooted in forest-based cultural ecological systems.
With environmental col lapse comes social disintegration that erodes cultural mechanisms that normally would help counter the spread of diseases like HIV (Usher 1992) . Just as there are links between environ mental degradation and drug trafficking, there are also links between drug use and disease. Of the 50,000 heroin addicts monitored by Bang kok's Office of Narcotics Control board, most are HIV positive from needle sharing. Seventy four percent of Burma's estimated HIV carriers are heroin users (Chalk 1997) .
Global warming is likely to increase the inci dence and range of various infectious diseases posing serious social and economic burdens on Southeast Asian governments and threatening the health of the Japanese people directly. For example, in the highlands of Papua New Guinea malaria carrying mosquitoes have over the past 15 years expanded their range into altitudinal zones previously malaria free. By 2020 the risk of malaria transmission in parts of Japan itself could double (Epstien 2000) . Simplification of ecosystems resulting from deforestation and agricultural expansion is already exacerbating disease problems in the Southeast Asia. In Ma laysia, this has been documented by medical geographers (Meade, Florin and Gesler 1988) .
During the 1970s and 1980s the Malaysia Fed eral Land Development Authority (FELDA) re settled farmers needing land in rainforest areas. As trees were felled and vegetation burned, streams were exposed to sunlight creating an ideal breeding ground for malaria carrying mosquitoes. In some areas cleared land was left vacant and overrun by coarse grass that pro vided an ideal habitat for disease carrying rats thereby increasing exposure of women and children to scrub typhus.
Most terrorist violence in Southeast Asia is associated with ethnic or other separatist move ments such as those discussed earlier (Table 1 As mentioned previously, Southeast Asia is a major supplier of natural resources and food to Japan. Depletion and degradation of these re sources through pollution, population pressure, climate change, poor development practices threaten to deprive Japan of important raw material sources or at least increase prices for key resources thus negatively impacting Ja pan's economic well-being. Ironically, Japan's own actions are a significant factor behind the degradation of the Southeast Asia's environ mental and resource base. Japan's demand for tropical timber has been a major driver behind deforestation in Southeast Asia since the 1960s (Dauvergne 1997). By the mid-1990s, however, hardwood exports from Southeast Asia to Japan have declined in part as diminishing sup plies force the Japanese to look elsewhere for timber (Dauvergne 1997) . Furthermore, in the 1970s and 1980s, Japanese firms relocated en ergy and pollution-intensive industries to Southeast Asia (Ofreneo 1993; Karan and Jas parro 2000) thus contributing to the region's increasing levels of industrial pollution. In fact 42 of 56 Japanese businessmen, earlier cited as viewing political and macroeconomic stability as significant in influencing Japanese FDI, also saw lax environmental pollution control regula tions as either moderately or extremely impor tant (Karan and Jasparro 2000) .
Japan's complicity in regional environmental problems may ultimately affect the credibility of its regional environmental initiatives. Inter views held with residents (100 persons in each locale) living near Japanese firms in Indonesia (Jakarta, Kalimantan), Malaysia (Klang Valley, Sarawak), Thailand (Bangkok), Philippines (Ma nila), and Singapore (Table 2) suggest there is a strong public perception that Japanese activi ties have adversely impacted the region's air and water quality (Karan and Jasparro 2000) . Japans' contributions to environmental degra dation in Southeast Asia also suggest that envi ronmental security is an internal as well as an external matter.
In other words, in order to What does the future hold in regard to Ja pan's environmental security posture in South east Asia? The pacifism and conservatism of the Japanese people combined with growing emphasis in international security circles on human welfare (human security) will provide some impetus and justification for Japan to ex plore 'soft-power' options. Promoting environ mental security through the provision of ODA, for instance, may then have some attraction to Japan's government and public. The implica tions of pursuing a concerted environmental security strategy on Japan's ODA, foreign, and security policies is thus an area warranting fur ther research.
However, environmental secu rity threats like other types of transnational dangers are generally slow moving and indi rect. They lack "a crisis focal point where poli cymakers and government leaders can direct their attention and energy" (Smith 2000 
